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ABSTRACT
Whereas most of the world has experienced decreasing fertility during the past half century, Israel
has experienced a puzzling mix of trends. Completed fertility has decreased sharply in some
ethnic-religious groups (Mizrahi Jews and non-Bedouin Arabs) and increased moderately in other groups
(non-ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi and Israeli-born Jews). In a phenomenon that can only be described as
a reverse fertility transition, fertility has increased substantially (from about 3 to 6 children per women)
among ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi and Israeli-born Jews. This paper explores how private and social
incentives for fertility may have combined to produce the complex pattern of fertility in Israel. Theoretical
analysis of the social dynamics of fertility shows that this pattern could have been generated by the joint
effects of (a) private preferences for childbearing, (b) preferences for conformity to group fertility norms,
and (c) the major child-allowance program introduced by the Israeli government in the 1970s.
Econometric analysis of fertility decisions shows that fundamental identification problems make it
difficult to infer the actual Israeli fertility process from data on completed fertility.  Hence we are able to
conjecture meaningfully on what may have happened, but we cannot definitively resolve the Israeli
fertility puzzles.
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Demographers have long wavered between two perspectives on fertility behavior: Homo 
Economicus, who chooses an optimal family size, and Homo Sociologicus, who conforms to social 
norms (see Hammel 1990).  These two perspectives dominate the ongoing debate on the underlying 
sources of the fertility transition - the recent historic sharp decline in fertility toward rates that are 
below replacement.  Summaries of this debate by Cleland and Wilson (1987) and by Bongaarts and 
Watkins (1996) find fault with the “economic approach” for failing to explain why the fertility 
transition has occurred in different places under rather different economic conditions, and why the 
initial stage of the transition is so rapid, relative to the more gradual pace of economic change. Both 
articles cite a general need to incorporate “sociological” elements into economic models of fertility, 
and a particular need to understand how social norms affect fertility and evolve. 
Although discussions of fertility sometimes give the impression that economics and 
sociology offer competing models of fertility, the two approaches are compatible with one another. 
Women may choose family size to maximize utility functions that recognize both private and social 
incentives for fertility, and social incentives may themselves evolve as an outcome of these 
childbearing decisions.  Indeed a rapidly growing literature on the economics of social interactions 
has sought to understand how such processes operate in education, residential choice, labor markets, 
and many other environments [see Becker and Murphy (2000), Manski (2000), and the references 
therein]. Kohler (2001) presents a recent attempt to formally incorporate social interactions into the 
analysis of fertility choice.  
   This paper explores how private and social incentives for fertility may have combined to 
produce the rather complex fertility pattern observed in Israel in the past half-century.  Table 1 
summarizes random sample data on completed fertility (lifetime number of children) among Israeli 
women alive and married in 1995, who married either before 1955 or in the period 1970-80.  The 
table is based on a special file that merged information from the 1983 Census and the 1995 national  
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Population Registry prepared at our request by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.  It shows that 
fertility in Israel displays considerable variation both over time and across major ethnic/religious 
sub-groups of the population.  
 
Table 1. Average Completed Fertility among Israeli Women Alive in 1995 
  Married prior to 1955  Married 1970-80
 
Ethnicity





































In parentheses: the number of women in each cell in the sample. 
 
Comparing women married prior to 1955 with those married 1970-80, the table shows that 
completed fertility declined among Jewish women of Mizrahi origin (whose father was born in Asia 
or North Africa) and among non-Bedouin Arab women, in accords with trends worldwide. Yet 
childbearing increased in all other sub-groups of the population.  It increased slightly (from 3.06 to 
3.12) among non-ultra-orthodox Jewish women whose parents were born in Israel, and moderately 
(from 2.29 to 2.88) among non-ultra-orthodox women of Ashkenazi origin (whose father was born in 
Europe or America). In a phenomenon that can only be described as a reverse fertility transition, 
fertility increased rapidly and substantially  (from 3.03 to 5.91, and from 2.76 to 5.88) among ultra-
orthodox women of these origins.  
What explains the dissimilar levels and trends in completed fertility among different groups 
of Israeli women?  It is easy to suggest a set of private and social forces that may have combined to  
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yield the complex pattern of fertility depicted in Table 1.  The potentially relevant sources of time-
series and cross-sectional variation in fertility include these:
1 
 
The fertility transition: Standard economic and social-cultural explanations of the fertility transition 
can readily rationalize the substantial declines in fertility among Israeli Arabs and among Jews of 
Mizrahi origin.  In both groups, women married prior to 1955 largely lived in traditional societies 
characterized by low income and high child mortality, but women married in 1970-1980 lived in the 
western-oriented society of modern Israel, characterized by relatively high income and low child 
mortality. 
 
Religiosity: Ultra orthodox Jewish women follow the directives of their rabbis, who encourage high 
fertility and discourage the use of contraceptives. Other Jewish women may hold varying preferences 
for family size and are not subject to strong religious strictures against contraception. 
 
Social Interactions: The various ethnic and religious sub-populations of Israeli have interacted to 
different degrees over the past half-century, and so may have been subject to different social norms 
for childbearing.  Adoption of the fertility norms of Ashkenazi Jews by the Mizrahi Jews, most of 
who migrated to Israel in the 1950s, may partly explain the fertility decline in the latter group. 
Increased integration between these two groups may partly explain the increased fertility among the 
former. Yet, throughout the past half-century, the Jewish ultra-orthodox, the Jewish non-ultra-
orthodox, and the Arab sub-populations of Israel have largely resided, been schooled, and worked in 
separate, almost isolated communities.  
 
Recent history: The traumatic decimation of European Jewry in the Holocaust may have affected 
fertility in the period following World War II.  Thus, it is sometimes argued that the Holocaust 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the underlying sources of the Israeli fertility pattern see Friedlander and Carole (1993).  
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reduced the fecundity of the women who were directly affected, but increased the desire to have 
children among survivors and the kin of non-survivors.  It has also been suggested that the relatively 
high death rates experienced or expected by some sub-groups of Israelis in repeated wars may have 
increased the desired number of children, as a form of insurance. 
 
Child allowances and related public welfare programs.  Changes in public policy have generated 
time-series variation in private incentives for fertility.  In 1970-75, the Israeli government introduced 
a universal (non income-tested) child allowance program that ranks among the most generous in the 
world.  Modest monthly payments are made to families with one or two children under age 18, but 
the payments for each child from the fourth up are substantial.  The 1960s and early 1970s also saw 
the introduction of other major welfare programs that reduced the private cost of childbearing and 
childcare.  On the whole, women married prior to 1955 bore their children before the introduction of 
the child allowance and other welfare programs, while women who married after 1970 were subject 
to them throughout their childbearing years. 
Juxtaposition of the child allowance program and the Israeli fertility patterns in Table 1 
suggests that enactment of the allowance program in 1970-75 may explain some of the trends shown, 
particularly the reverse fertility transition among the ultra-orthodox of Ashkenazi origin. However, 
the same allowance program applied to other segments of the Jewish population, who experienced a 
variety of different fertility trends. 
 
These and perhaps other disparate forces have somehow combined to determine fertility in 
Israel.  The puzzle, or set of puzzles, is how to disentangle these forces and identify the 
socioeconomic process at work. From a public policy perspective, there is particular interest in 
learning how the child allowance and other welfare programs have affected, and continue to affect, 
fertility.  From a social science perspective, there is a general interest in learning how private and 
social incentives interact to determine childbearing.  This paper addresses the puzzles posed by  
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Israeli fertility patterns and makes some, albeit incomplete, progress towards its resolution.  
We begin with the public policy question, focusing on the child allowance program.  Section 
2, which draws on Mayshar and Manski (2001), describes the history of the program, compares it 
with similar ones in Europe, and recalls Malthus’ hypothesis on the fertility effects of child 
allowances.  We also present in this section a more complete picture of how Israeli fertility evolved 
over time for different social groups.  
The empirical associations that we find between the child allowance program and the time-
series variation in fertility are intriguing but necessarily inconclusive.  The challenge is to dig 
beneath these associations to learn how private and social incentives may have combined to 
determine fertility. Section 3 poses a model of family-size decisions that flexibly represents some 
aspects of decision making while abstracting from others. The model assumes that, at some point 
after marriage, a woman chooses a family size that is optimal, given the information available at the 
time.
2  The woman’s valuation of bearing a given number of children depends on her private 
preference for family-size, her preference for conformity to social norms in childbearing, and the 
child allowance that the mother would receive. Perhaps the main respect in which the model 
abstracts from actual childbearing behavior is its neglect of the dynamics of birth timing, a subject 
that has been a focus of some recent economic research (see Hotz and Miller, 1988, Walker 1995).  
Abstracting from timing issues enables us to determine how optimal family size varies with fertility 
preferences, social norms, and child allowances. 
  Our model of family-size decisions, although simple in many respects, is still too complex in 
its general formulation to permit much in the way of theoretical analysis.  After making further 
simplifying assumptions, we are able to characterize the social dynamics of fertility with 
considerable clarity.  Given these assumptions, we find that a proportional allowance formula, in 
                                                 
2  We follow the long tradition in demography of attributing fertility decisions to women rather than to couples.  This 
attribution is merely semantic in the large majority of cases in Israel, which has been characterized by low rates of non-




which the magnitude of the benefit is proportional to the number of children, generates a simple 
dynamic in which the distribution of family size converges to a unique steady state.  In this case, the 
value of steady-state mean family size varies linearly with the magnitude of the allowance; it is 
however independent of the magnitude of preferences for conformity to social fertility norms and of 
the dispersion of the distribution of private fertility preferences. 
  A piecewise linear allowance formula of the type enacted in Israel is then shown to generate 
rather different dynamics.  It continues to be the case that the distribution of family size converges to 
a steady state.  However, steady-state mean family size now does depend on preferences for 
conformity to social norms and on the shape of the distribution of private fertility preferences.  
Moreover, some configurations generate multiple steady states, some being locally stable and others 
not.  Performing numerical calculations in particular cases, we are able to demonstrate that small 
changes in the magnitude of allowances or in private fertility preferences can, in principle, yield 
rather large changes in mean fertility; on the order of the changes observed in Israel between 1950 
and 1980.
3 
Section 4 describes our efforts to use the fertility model developed in Section 3 to interpret 
the actual decisions made by Israeli women.  The goal was to estimate a version of the model that 
could be applied to examine how Israeli child allowance policy has affected family-size decisions. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to credibly separate the effects on decision making of child 
allowances, private fertility preferences, and preferences for conformity.  Our attempts to fit 
reasonably flexible versions of the model yielded unstable, unreliable estimates.  A qualitatively 
‘sensible’ estimate of the effect of child allowances on fertility emerged only when we maintained 
assumptions that we feel are too strong to be believable.    
The main contribution of Section 4 is to explain the identification problem that we faced 
                                                 
3 Previous research on endogenous social interactions, wherein each decision-maker is influenced by the decisions of 
others, has shown that such interactions can produce social multipliers that magnify the individualistic effects of policy 
interventions (see Manski, 1993).  Previous research has also shown that endogenous interactions can generate complex  
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when attempting to estimate the fertility model.  The basic problem, common to all econometric 
analysis of choice behavior, is that observation of a woman’s chosen family size only partly reveals 
her preferences; hence the fertility preferences of Israeli women cannot be learned in an entirely 
empirical manner.  A specific problem in our analysis is that the information about preferences 
revealed by data on completed fertility depends qualitatively on the shape of the child allowance 
formula that women face; revealed preference analysis is more difficult when the benefit is 
proportional to family size than when it is nonlinear.  The Israeli allowance has, to varying degrees 
over the years, been nonlinear in family size.  However, we found in practice that nonlinearity of the 
formula provides an insubstantial foundation for empirical analysis.  
  Viewing our work in toto, we see a clear empirical contribution in our description of the 
complex time-series and cross-sectional pattern of Israeli fertility (Section 2).  Our theoretical 
analysis of the joint determination of fertility dynamics by private preferences, preferences for 
conformity, and child allowances helps to understand how such a complex pattern of fertility may 
have come to be (Section 3).  However, our structural empirical analysis of fertility decisions does 
not persuasively disentangle the forces at work (Section 4).  This being so, we can at best conjecture 
on the processes that have generated Israeli fertility.  Section 5 presents our concluding thoughts. 
 
 
2. Child Allowances and Fertility in Israel 
 
Section 2.1 describes the history of the Israeli child allowance program.  Section 2.2 
compares this program with ones in Europe and summarizes empirical research on the Malthusian 
hypothesis that child allowance programs increase fertility among the poor.  Section 2.3 then 
examines fertility patterns in Israel. 
                                                                                                                                                             
dynamics with potentially multiple steady states (see Brock and Durlauf, 2001).  Our findings are based on an interaction 




2.1.  The Israeli Child Allowance Program 
 
The Israeli welfare state has subsidized childbearing and childcare through a number of 
mechanisms, including provision of free education and health insurance, generous maternity grants, 
tax benefits for working mothers, and housing benefits that depend on the number of children.
4 In the 
major tax reform of 1975, Israel instituted a generous child allowance program that quadrupled the 
allowances granted up to 1969.
5 Since 1975, the National Insurance Institute (NII) has annually 
allocated more than 1.6 percent of GDP to this program.  A notable feature of the program is that the 
size of the allowance varies substantially with the birth order of the child, with the first two children 
under age 18 receiving minimal benefits, and each child from the fourth on receiving a large benefit. 
Enactment of the child allowance program was in part a response to growing ethnic 
discontent among Mizrahi Jews who had immigrated to Israel from Arab countries after 1948 or 
from North Africa in the early 1960s.  These Jews were often poor and had large families. A 
universal child allowance was thought at the time to be an effective way to reduce their poverty, 
without creating the work disincentives thought to be characteristic of income-tested benefits.
6 In 
fact, enactment of the child allowance program appears to have had a dramatic short run impact in 
                                                 
4 See Doron and Kramer (1991) for background on the development of Israel’s welfare system. 
 
5 The child allowance program enacted under the 1975 tax reform replaced a complex system of benefits for children that 
included tax credits, small mandatory child payments by private employers, minor allowances by the NII to large 
families, and a more substantial allowance to children of army veterans that had been enacted in 1971. 
 
6 The report of the national commission that recommended the 1975 tax reform (State of Israel, 1975) indicates that the 
possible impact of child allowances on fertility was not an important consideration at the time.  Moreover, an earlier 
commission of demographers (State of Israel, 1966), set up to study pro-natalist policies, had concluded in 1966 that: “it 
would not be appropriate to recommend monthly grants for families as an incentive to have children for the following 
reasons: small grants do not have any impact on increased fertility… if the grant ...would be ...large, then considerable 
sums of money will flow to large families, for whom it would not provide a birth incentive, because they do not practice 




reducing the incidence of poverty among Israeli children in the mid-1970s.  Since then, however, the 
percentage of Israeli children living below the poverty line has steadily increased.
7 
The child allowance program uses a credit point system under which mothers receive a 
monthly, tax-exempt allowance from the NII, the allowance equaling the number of credit points to 
which her children are entitled, multiplied by the cash value of a credit point. The number of credit 
points depends on the number of children in the family who are below the age of 18; prior to 1997, it 
also depended on whether the family had the status of ‘army veterans.’
8 Appendix Table A-1 
presents the credit point formula in effect from 1975 through 2000.  Figure 1 shows how the New 
Israel Shekel (NIS) value of Israeli child allowance benefits has evolved over the longer period 1965-
1999. 
As Figure 1 and Table A-1 indicate, various adjustments have been made in the child 
allowance program since 1975. The real value of credit points eroded initially due to inflation, but 
has been fully linked to the CPI since 1987. In addition, repeated changes have been made in the 
credit point formula, with the number of credit points for children of high birth-order gradually 
increasing over time.  In 1983, the number of credit points allocated to families with veteran status 
and four or more children increased by fifty percent.
9  In 1994 and 2000, the credit points for 
children from the fourth up were raised further. 
                                                 
7  According to NII annual reports, the incidence of child poverty rose from 9.6% to 13.9% between 1979 and 1984. 
Using somewhat different definitions, between 1987 and 1997, the incidence of child poverty rose from 9.5% to 11.8% 
among families of wage earners, and from 20.5% to 21.8% in the population at large.  The increase in the overall 
incidence of child poverty, despite the significant decline of family size among the relatively poorer two main sub-groups 
of the population, Arabs and Mizrahi Jews, can be explained by the increased weight of these two groups in the 
population, and, in addition, by the increased family size and population weight of ultra-Orthodox Jews. 
 
8 The conditions for obtaining veteran status prior to 1993 were such that almost all Jews received it, including the ultra-
Orthodox who by and large did not serve in the army.  Almost all Arabs, for whom army service is voluntary, did not 
receive it.  Beginning in 1993, the dependence of the allowance on veteran status was gradually phased out over four 
years.  From 1997 on, all children receive the full allowance. 
 
9 Between 1985 and 1992, fiscal concerns led to suspension of the allowance for the first child to families with fewer than 
four children and with income above a certain low threshold; in 1991-2 this suspension was extended to the second child. 
This created some work disincentives and administrative confusion due to the income threshold, and also implied that the  
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As Table A-1 shows, the marginal allowance granted for children from the fourth up fully 
covers the marginal cost of caring for these children in a manner that averts poverty, as calculated 
using Israel’s official poverty line for families of different sizes. To give a sense of the magnitude of 
the allowances, consider families with six children under age 18. In 1999, such families received a 
monthly tax-exempt allowance of NIS 2,566, equivalent to about $640 per month, and to 39 percent 


















Figure 1: Annual value of child allowances per family, by number of children 




2.2. European Child allowances and the Malthusian Hypothesis 
 
Allowances for children are not new. Already in the second century AD, an extensive 
alimenta system of public subsistence payments to children was in force in Rome. According to 
Duncan-Jones (1974, 295), this system was “evidently intended to encourage a rise in the birth-rate.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
marginal allowance for the fourth child whose total allowances were kept intact (for families with income above the 
income threshold) increased from 3.75 to 4.75 and then to 5.75 credit points.  
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The motivation apparently was the shortage of Romans to run the empire, but other historians 
emphasize other motives. 
The English Poor Laws, initiated during the reign of Elizabeth I, were clearly motivated by 
welfare considerations rather than by a pro-natalist sentiment. As is well known, it was a proposal by 
William Pitt to increase family benefits for the poor that prompted Thomas Malthus’ 1798 Essay on 
the Principle of Population. In the fifth chapter, Malthus contended that providing financial support 
for poor families as a function of family size would not contribute toward alleviating poverty; to the 
contrary, in the long run it would exacerbate poverty by encouraging poor families to have more 
children or to work less. According to Malthus, well-intended allowances for families in need may 
thus become a trap that could contribute toward perpetuating poverty in general, and among children 
in particular.
10  The empirical validity of Malthus’ hypothesis on the fertility effects of the English 
Poor laws was subject to much criticism, but a recent study by Boyer (1989) seems to confirm 
Malthus.  
Modern day child allowances seem to be motivated by a mixture of concern for the welfare of 
children and concern with forecasts of declining population. The latter was clearly paramount in the 
case of France and Belgium, which introduced universal child allowances in the 1930s. Following 
their lead, all European countries and almost all other developed countries in the world followed suit 
— with the notable exception of the United States.
11  Notwithstanding the large magnitude of these 
programs, there has been no definitive study of the demographic effects of modern European 
programs of child and family support.  Yet the consensus seems to be that these programs have had 
at most a negligible impact on fertility.  It is often noted that France, with possibly the most generous 
(and complex) child support program in the world, has an overall birth rate no higher than that of 
                                                 
10  Under Malthus’ influence, Pitt withdrew his proposal. Later on, Britain radically amended its poor laws, still much 
influenced by Malthus’ ideas. 
  





neighboring countries, where the allowance program is less extensive. Based on an econometric 
study of 22 industrialized countries from 1970 to 1990, Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) have reported 
that child support programs may have had a positive effect on birth, but one of a very small 
magnitude.  Specifically, they estimate that a 25% increase in child support benefits would increase 
total fertility from an average of 1.71 children per woman to 1.78 children per woman.  Several 
studies on European countries have concluded that pro-natalist policies have encouraged women to 
give birth earlier, yet have had practically no effect on total lifetime births (see Walker, 1995; 
Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997). 
 
2.3. Fertility Patterns in Israel 
 
The standard source of information on fertility in Israel has been annual data on total fertility, 
a construct that measures the average lifetime number of births a woman would have if she were to 
give birth over time according to the current birth rates of women of different age cohorts. Figure 2 
presents the time series of total fertility in Israel among the three major ethnic sub-populations: 
Ashkenazi Jews, Mizrahi Jews, and Arab Moslems.
12  The figure shows a significant decline up to 
the middle 1970s and middle 1980s within the latter two groups, and a fluctuating total fertility rate 
among Ashkenazi Jews.
13 
                                                 
12 The trend in total fertility of Arab Christians, not shown in the figure, differs from that of Arab Moslems. The total 
fertility rate of Christians initially was similar to that of Moslems, but declined by the 1990s to levels below that of 
Ashkenazi Jews.  
 
13 Berman (2000) has used data from surveys of the Israeli labor force to estimate total fertility among Israeli ultra-
orthodox in the periods 1980-84 and for 1994-96. He finds (Table VI) that total fertility increased from 6.9 to 7.8 among 
Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox, and from 4.6 to 7.2 among Mizrahi ultra-orthodox. Berman interprets this recent rise in total 
fertility, as well as increased religious stringency and reduced labor participation, as a response of a “club to a change in 
















Figure 2: Total Fertility rates of the Main Sub-populations in Israel, 1949-1996 
 
The trends depicted in this figure do not suggest that the child allowance program, enacted in 
1970-5, has had any material effect on fertility.  However, total fertility is a synthetic-cohort 
construct that may not adequately represent the childbearing decisions of actual women.  Moreover, 
the Malthusian hypothesis concerning the fertility effects of child allowances should apply primarily 
to poor families, who form just part of the large sub-populations depicted in Figure 2.  For these 
reasons, we decided to obtain data that would enable a less aggregated and more accurate portrayal of 
Israeli fertility patterns than has previously been possible. 
At our request, the Central Bureau of Statistics prepared a special data file merging 
information from the 1983 Census of Population and Housing and the 1995 Population Registry. We 
begin with the random sample of households in which the husband and wife completed the ‘long 
form’ of the 1983 Census.  Within these households, we identified all women born between 1920 
and 1960 who were married at the time of the census, whose husbands were also enumerated, and  
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whose national identity card numbers appear in the 1995 Population Registry.
14  The Population 
Registry links the identity numbers of children to those of their mothers; hence we were able to 
determine the number and age of children born to each woman until 1995.
15 
To understand Israeli fertility patterns, we felt it important to disaggregate the three major 
ethnic sub-populations into more homogeneous groups.  Information collected from respondents to 
the 1983 Census made it straightforward to distinguish Bedouins from other Arabs, and to 
distinguish Jews whose parents were born in Israel from those whose parents immigrated to the 
country.
16  We also thought it important to disaggregate Jewish Israelis by degree of religiosity, 
particularly to distinguish ultra-orthodox Jews from others.  This was more problematic, because 
respondents to the 1983 Census were not asked to report their religious practices.  We ultimately 
used a schooling-based criterion, previously applied by Dahan (1998), whereby families are 
identified as ultra-Orthodox if the last place of study that was reported by the husband in the 1983 
census was a post-secondary yeshiva (an orthodox institute of religious study).
17 
Table 1, introduced in Section 1, uses the merged Census and Population Registry data to 
present completed fertility rates within each of eight groups defined by ethnic origin and religiosity. 
The table provides a simple ‘before-and-after’ perspective on the association between fertility and 
the 1970-5 child allowance program.  To accomplish this, we distinguish women married prior to 
1955, who generally completed child-bearing before initiation of the program, from those married in 
                                                 
14  In cases where a woman had multiple marriages, here and throughout the paper we use “year of marriage” to mean 
“year of first marriage.” 
 
15  The linkage of children’s identification numbers to those of their mothers is quite accurate for children born after 
1960, but incomplete for children born in the 1950s and almost nonexistent for children born earlier.  Fortunately, the 
1983 census itself provides information on the total number of live births up to that year.  A detailed explanation of the 
manner in which we combined Population Registry and Census data to determine each sampled woman’s births is 
available in a technical memorandum which can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
 
16  In principle, we could further disaggregate those with Israeli-born parents into Ashkenazi and Mizrahi subgroups.  We 
do not do so because the samples of ultra-orthodox segments of these subgroups are quite small. 
 
17 See Mayshar and Manski (2001) for analyses of fertility patterns that use alternatives to this criterion for identification 
of religiosity.  
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the period 1970-1980, who were eligible for the allowances throughout most or all of their 
childbearing years.  The table excludes women married between 1955 and 1970 because their 
childbearing period straddles the date of the policy change.  It excludes those married after 1980, 
who were married only shortly before the 1983 census and had less then 15 years of marriage up to 
1995.
18 
The disaggregated data on completed fertility in Table 1 present a more nuanced portrayal of 
Israeli fertility patterns than do the more aggregated data on total fertility presented in Figure 2.  As 
already discussed in Section 1, the table shows that Israel manifests the worldwide trend towards 
reduced childbearing only within the Mizrahi-Jewish and Arab-non-Bedouin sub-populations. 
Within all other groups, completed fertility among women married in the period near the 1975 
reform is higher than among women married earlier on.  The increase in completed fertility among 
ultra-orthodox Jews of non-Mizrahi origin is little short of astonishing.  On average, women in these 
groups approximately doubled their childbearing, from about three children per women to about six. 
Other analyses of our sample data reinforce the impression that the completed fertility rates 
of ultra- orthodox Ashkenazi Jews substantially increased in the period around the 1975 tax reform.
19 
The discussion below focuses on Jewish Israelis because Arab Israelis, not having veteran status, 
generally did not receive significant child allowances at any point during the period of our analysis. 
Figures 3 and 4 supplement the data on averages in Table 1, while concentrating on the 
fertility among ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi women. In Figure 3 we present the entire distribution of 
completed fertility, comparing those married before 1955 with those married in 1970-1980.  The 
figure demonstrates the substantial shift rightward in the distribution. The mode increased from two 
to five children. The percentage of women with three children or less fell from 78% to 23%. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
18 Some women who married before 1980 were still of child bearing age in 1995. We used ethnic-group, age-specific 
fertility rates for 1994-5 to predict childbearing by these women after 1995.  
 
19 The sample of ultra-orthodox Jews with Israeli born parents is too small to support the analyses to be discussed, so we 
now focus on the ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi Jews.    
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Figure 4 moves away from completed fertility and compares the kernel-smoothed age-
specific fertility rates of ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi women in the five-year periods that just straddle 
the 1970-5 allowances reform: 1965-9 and 1975-9. For women of age 21 and below, the age-specific 
rates are essentially identical in the two periods.  However, the rates for women of age 22 and above 















Figure 3. Distribution of Completed Fertility among Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi Women: 






































Figure 4. Comparison of Age-Specific Fertility Rates for Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi Women: 




The final descriptive evidence that we present in Figure 5 shows kernel-smoothed completed 
fertility rates by year of marriage, for each of the four sub-groups of Israeli Jews whose parents were 
not born in Israel.  The overall message of Figure 5 is surprisingly simple to describe, albeit not to 
explain.  During 1945-1950, completed fertility varied by ethnicity, with Mizrahi women bearing 
about three times as many children as did Ashkenazi women.  Thirty years later, during 1975-1980, 
completed fertility again separates the population into two groups, but now the relevant dimension is 
religiosity rather than ethnicity, with ultra-orthodox women bearing about twice as many children as 
non ultra-orthodox Jewish women.  Such large, group-specific changes in fertility present an 
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Figure 5: Completed Fertility among Jewish sub-groups, by year of marriage 
 
 
3. Family-Size Decisions: Private Preferences, Child Allowances, and Social Interactions 
 
To do more than speculate about the fertility patterns described in Section 2, it seems 
essential to model the family decision processes that generate the population statistics.  Combining 
basic elements of economic and sociological thinking, we think it plausible to suppose that women  
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choose family size to maximize utility functions that recognize both private and social incentives for 
fertility.  The private incentives depend in part on government policy toward children, one aspect of 
which is the child allowance program.  The social incentives depend in part on the childbearing 
behavior of peers. 
We pose a decision model with these properties here.  The model aims to balance realism and 
tractability so as to provide a suitable vehicle for analysis of fertility decisions. 
 
3.1. Maintained Assumptions 
 
We assume that a woman chooses family size irrevocably sometime after marriage, based on 
the information available at the time.  Thus we abstract from revisions to family planning that may 
occur if new information later becomes available.  Let t denote the date of the fertility decision, j 
denote a woman choosing family size (i.e., number of children) at that date, and k denote family size. 
 We assume that woman j assigns utility Utj(k) to having k children and acts to maximize utility. 
Thus the woman chooses 
 
(1)    ktj   =  argmax k = 0, 1, . . . Utj(k) 
 
children, assuming that the argmax is unique.  We assume no infertility and no child mortality, or 
similar sources of uncertainty that could prevent some women from realizing their family-size plans. 
We also take the spacing of the k births as predetermined. 
We now further assume that the above utility function has three additively separable 
components, the first two expressing private incentives and the third expressing social incentives: 
 
(i). a private utility of family size, assumed quadratic in the number of children.  This is ajk  - 
bjk




(ii). a government incentive for childbearing embodied in the child allowances formula prevailing at 
the time of the fertility decision.  This is Atj(k), the discounted life-cycle allowance that woman j 
would receive under the formula prevailing at the decision date, if j were to have k children; we 
assume that Atj(0) = 0.  The magnitude of the allowance may vary with characteristics of the woman, 
such as veteran status. Let Itj denote the family’s expected life-cycle income from date t on; here we 
assume, for simplicity, that income does not depend on family size.  Then expected life-cycle 
consumption if woman j were to have k children is Atj(k) + Itj.  The contribution to utility of such 
consumption is cj[Atj(k) + Itj], where cj > 0 is a woman-specific parameter. 
 
(iii). a social interaction wherein the woman compares k with the actual family sizes of other women 
in the population.  We assume that the population is composed of M mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive strata, or reference groups.  Consider group m.  Woman j incurs a utility loss that grows 
with the squared deviation between k and the size of each family in group m. The woman averages 
these losses across the members of m, yielding the average loss Σ h (k - h)
2 Ptm(h), where Ptm(h) is the 
fraction of women in group m having h children.  Finally, the woman aggregates the average losses 
across the M groups, yielding the aggregate loss -Σ m wmj [Σ h (k - h)
2 Ptm(h)], where wj  ≡   (wmj, m = 
1, …, M) are parameters that measure the utility weight the woman attaches to each group.  We 
assume that wmj > 0, m = 1,…,M. 
 
Combining the private, government, and social determinants, the form of the utility function 
that we assume is 
 
(2)   Utj(k)  =  ajk  - bjk






3.2. Optimal Family Size 
 
Let Stm  =  Σ h h Ptm(h) be the mean number of children in group m at date t. For each m,  
 
(3)   Σ h (k - h)
2 Ptm(h)  =  Σ h [(k - Stm)  +  (Stm - h)]
2 Ptm(h)   =   (k - Stm)
2  + Σ h (h - Stm)
2 Ptm(h) 
   =     k
2 – 2kStm + Stm
2  + Σ h (h - Stm)
2 Ptm(h) . 
 
It follows that 
 
(4)   Utj(k)  =  Utj(0) + ajk  -  bjk
2  + cjAtj(k)  -  (Σ m wmj)k
2  +  2(Σ m wmj Stm)k 
           =   Utj(0) + (aj + 2Σ m wmj Stm)k  -  (bj + Σ m wmj)k




(5)   ktj   =  argmax k= 0, 1, ….  (aj + 2Σ m wmj Stm)k  -  (bj + Σ m wmj)k
2  + cjAtj(k). 
 
The model yielding equation (5) expresses many core features of economic and sociological 
thinking about fertility decisions.  The model acknowledges that family size is a discrete choice 
problem and recognizes that women may have heterogeneous preferences, expressed through the 
woman-specific parameters (a, b, c, w).  The model flexibly expresses the idea that social norms may 
affect fertility.  We suppose that each woman may pay attention to childbearing in multiple reference 
groups and place different weight on the practices of each group.  A woman may be concerned with 
the entire distribution of family size within each group.  Yet, as shown in equations (3) and (4), the 
model has the simplifying property that decision making ultimately depends only on mean family 
size in each group, not the entire distribution.  
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  The model yields an especially simple solution if the child allowance is proportional to the 
number of children in a family.  Thus, suppose that Atj(k)  =  π tjk for some π tj > 0.  Then (5) becomes 
 
(6)   ktj  =   argmax k= 0, 1, …. (aj + 2Σ m wmj Stm + cjπ tj)k  -  (bj + Σ m wmj)k
2. 
 
Observe that both composite coefficients are positive.  Hence utility is quadratic in family size with 
its maximum at 
 
                           aj + 2Σ m wmj Stm + cjπ tj  
(7)   ktj  =   INT[    +  ½], 
                                 2(bj + Σ m wmj) 
 
where INT[A] denotes the integer component of the real number in brackets. 
  Of course, the model does not express all potentially important features of fertility decisions. 
In particular, it neglects associations between fertility and family income that form part of the 
Malthusian hypothesis.  It ignores possible connections between family-size decisions and female 
labor-supply decisions, which would make life-cycle income a function of family size.  It also 
ignores the possible contributions of child labor to life-cycle income.  Nevertheless, we feel that 
equation (5) provides an effective, practical starting point for theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
interaction of private and social incentives for fertility. 
Section 3.3 approaches the problem from a theoretical perspective, making further 
idealizations in order to achieve some understanding of the dynamics and steady-state distributions 
of family size that may be generated by the model.  Section 4 examines the problem from an 





3.3. The Social Dynamics of Fertility in Two Special Cases 
 
The fertility model introduced above, although simple in many respects, is still too complex to 
permit much in the way of theoretical analysis.  An interesting theoretical analysis becomes possible 
if we make four further assumptions, as follow: 
 
(a) The number of children is continuous, rather than integer-valued. 
(b) Each woman is influenced only by women in her own group who made their choices in the 
preceding period. 
(c) All women in a given ethnic-religious group have the same values of utility parameters (b, c, w), 
so that only the parameter aj may vary within the group.
20  The within-group distribution of this 
parameter is continuous and time-invariant, with density f(a). 
(d) The child allowance formula is piecewise linear in the number of children, with one kink.  The 
allowance formula is time-invariant and is the same for all members of a given group. 
 
Given these assumptions, we can consider each group in isolation and characterize the 
evolution of family size and the steady state distribution of family sizes.  We begin with the special 
case in which there is no kink, so the allowance is proportional to family size. 
                                                 
20  Letting c vary within the group does not qualitatively change the analysis, but complicates the notation somewhat. 
Given that behavior is unaffected by a positive multiplicative change in the four utility parameters (a, b, c, w), we could 




Allowances Proportional to Family Size 
  Suppose that the allowance formula is A(k) = π k, where π  > 0 is the time-invariant allowance 
per child.  Supposing that children are continuous and invoking the other assumptions above, 
equation (7) for the optimal family size for woman j who chooses family size at date t becomes: 
 
                  aj + 2wSt-1 + cπ  
(8)   ktj  =     , 
                       2(b + w) 
 
where St-1 is the mean family size of women who chose their family size at date t – 1.  It follows that 
the mean family size of women who choose at date t is 
 
                                a + 2wSt-1 + cπ                µ  + 2wSt-1 + cπ  
(9)   St  =   S(St-1, λ )  =  E[  ]     =         , 
                                         2(b + w)                 2(b + w) 
 
where  µ   ≡   E(a)  >  0, and where λ   ≡  [b, c, w, A(. ) f(. )] is the full set of parameters that characterize 
preferences and child allowances.
21 
  Equation (9) determines the social dynamics of mean family size. With b > 0 and w > 0, St 
converges monotonically to the unique steady state S
o that solves the equation 
 
(10)   S
o    =  S(S
0, λ ). 
 
The steady-state in this case of proportional allowances is: 
  
                                                 
21 Equation (9) shows that when allowances are proportional to family size, sufficient statistics for A(. ) and f(. ) are π  and 
µ .  
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                       µ  + cπ  
(11)   S
o    =     . 
                           2b 
 
This simple result is qualitatively unsurprising in many respects. The steady-state mean 
family size S
o increases with the magnitude of the allowance per child π  and with the parameter c 
measuring the contribution to utility of the allowance.  S
o also varies as expected with the private 
determinants of utility, increasing with µ  and decreasing with b. 
Observe, however, that S
o does not vary with the social interaction parameter w; hence there 
is no social multiplier effect. Furthermore, the steady state is unique and the fertility gap between any 
two groups who differ only in the parameter µ  is independent of the magnitude of the allowances.  
These results turn out to be peculiar to the case of proportional child allowances.  We show below 
that when the allowance is piecewise linear, steady-state mean family size may not be unique and 
may depend on w in a somewhat subtle manner. 
 With  S
o determined, it is straightforward to characterize the entire steady-state distribution of 
family sizes.  Inserting  St-1 = S
o in equation (8), we obtain that the steady-state optimal family size of 
a woman with private utility parameter a is 
 
                             a + 2wS
o + cπ             1      ba  + wµ                     
(12)   k
o(a, λ )  =        =      (     +   cπ ). 




o(a, λ ) is linear in a.  Hence the density function for optimal family size has the 
same shape as f(a), the density of a.  Observe that the child-allowance π  always shifts k
o(a, λ ) by the 
same amount, regardless of the value of a. Hence child allowances affect the central tendency of the 
distribution of family sizes but not its dispersion.  Finally, observe that k
o(a, λ ) is determined  by a 
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weighted average of a woman’s own utility parameter and the mean µ  of this parameter in the group, 
with weights b/(b + w) and w/(b + w) respectively.  Thus the social interaction parameter w, which 
was earlier shown not to affect the central tendency of the distribution of family size, does affect the 
dispersion of the distribution. All else equal, the larger the value of w, the more concentrated is the 
distribution around its mean S
o. 
 
Piecewise Linear Child Allowances 
Now suppose that the child allowance formula has the piecewise linear form 
 
A(k)  =  0 if k  <  K,                A(k)  =  π (k – K)   if k  >  K, 
 
where K > 0 is a specified threshold family size and π   >  0 is the time-invariant allowance per child 
from the K
th onward.
 22  Although the Israeli child allowance formula has changed over the years, the 
formula has always been reasonably well approximated by a function of this form. 
Given assumptions (a) – (d) and a piecewise linear allowance formula, the optimal family 
size is 
 
(13)   ktj   =  argmax k > 0 {(aj + 2wSt - 1)k  -  (b + w)k
2  +  cπ (k – K) · 1[k  >  K]}, 
 
where 1[k  >  K] is the indicator function taking the value one if k  >  K and zero otherwise. The 
                                                 
22 The present analysis generalizes easily to formulas that begin with a positive allowance per child and rise in marginal 
value after K children; that is, to formulas of the type 
 
 A(k)  =  π 1k if k  <  K, A(k)  =  π 2(k – K)   if k  >  K, where 0  <  π 1  <  π 2. 
 
However, the analysis does not apply to piecewise linear formulas that initially give larger allowance per child and then 
smaller ones; that is to formulas of the above type but with 0 < π 2 < π 1.  Such formulas have qualitatively different 




objective function in (13) is quadratic everywhere except at the point k = K, where its first derivative 
jumps by cπ  units.  Holding (b, w, c, π , K, St - 1) fixed, optimal family size can be shown to vary 
discontinuously with the utility parameter aj, the single discontinuity occurring at a certain pivot 
value a(St-1, λ ), which is 
 
(14)   a(St-1, λ )   =  2(b + w)K   -  2wSt-1   - cπ /2. 
 
In particular,  
 
                           aj + 2wSt-1 
(15a)        ktj  =         <   K              if    aj  <  a(St-1, λ ) 
                           2(b + w) 
 
                          aj + 2wSt-1 + cπ  
(15b)        ktj  =        >  K        if      aj  >  a(St-1, λ ). 
                               2(b + w) 
 
A woman whose parameter a equals the pivot value is indifferent between these two solutions. 
Recall that the distribution of the parameter a has been assumed continuous; hence the 
borderline case a = a(St-1, λ ) occurs with probability zero.  It follows that the mean family size 
among women who choose fertility at date t is 
 
                                   a + 2wSt-1                                    
(16)   St  =   S(St-1, λ )  =  E[      a  <  a(St-1, λ )] · Prob(a < a(St-1, λ )]      
                                               2(b + w) 
 
 
                            a + 2wSt-1 + cπ       
        +  E[     a  >  a(St-1, λ )] · Prob(a > a(St-1, λ )]    
                                                   2(b + w)                                                  
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                                              1                                    
                                    =     [ µ  + 2w St-1 + cπ  · Prob(a  >  a(St-1, λ )]. 
                            2(b + w) 
 
Inspection of equation (16) shows that, given any value of the parameters λ , the function S(St-1, λ ) is 
increasing and continuous in St-1; hence the recursive equation St = S(St-1, λ ) generates a monotone 
time path for mean family size.
23   
A steady state, where S
o = S(S
0, λ ), is defined implicitly by the condition 
 
           1 
(17)   S
o  =     [µ   +  cπ  · Prob(a > a(S° , λ )]. 
          2b 
 
Inspection of (17) shows that this equation necessarily has solutions, and these satisfy the inequalities 
µ /2b < S
o < (µ  + cπ )/2b.  That is, the steady state solutions with piecewise linear allowances lie 
between the steady state µ /2b that would prevail in the absence of allowances and the steady state (µ  
+ cπ )/2b that would prevail if allowances were proportional to family size. 
Implicit differentiation of equation (17) reveals that ∂ S
o/∂π   > 0 and ∂ S
o/∂ K  < 0. Thus, as 
should be expected, a more generous child allowance formula generates increases in steady-state 
mean family size. When π  > 0 and K > 0, similar differentiation also reveals that sgn(∂ S
o/∂ w) = 
sgn(S
0 – K).  Thus, stronger social interactions reinforce the deviation of steady state fertility away 
from the threshold K.  We think this last result particularly important, and so state it as a proposition: 
 
Proposition: Let our assumptions hold. Under a child allowance program with allowances 
proportional to family size, social interactions have no effect on mean steady state fertility S
o. Under 
                                                 
23 Equation (16) simplifies substantially if the support of the distribution of utility parameter a lies either entirely to the 
left or entirely to the right of a(St-1, λ ).  In the former case, where Prob(a > a(St-1, λ )] = 0, all women choose to have the 
family size that they would prefer in the absence of child allowances.  In the latter case, where Prob(a > a(St-1, λ )] = 1, all  
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a program with allowances piecewise linear and threshold K, stronger social interactions reinforce 
the deviation of S
o from K. 
 
This result is the key to our findings below on the differential effect of allowances on different social 
groups and on the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
 
Findings for Specific Distributions of Utility Parameters 
The above analysis partially characterizes steady state fertility when the allowance formula is 
piecewise linear, but important questions remain open. In particular, we would like to know whether 
the steady state equation (17) can have multiple solutions and we would like to understand the role of 
the social interaction parameter w in determining the steady state. Answers to these questions could 
shed light on the role that the piecewise linear Israeli child allowance system may have played in 
generating the sharply different fertility trends experienced by different ethnic-religious groups. As 
we have shown, a proportional allowance program, even when coupled with strong social 
interactions, cannot explain the reverse-fertility transition among Israeli ultra-orthodox woman, nor 
why their fertility behavior diverged so much from that of other groups in the population. 
To partially address the open questions, we now examine the dynamics of fertility under two 
hypotheses about the shape f(a) of the distribution of utility parameters. First we suppose that f(a) is 
uniform, a simple specification that yields a closed-form solution of the dynamic equation (16). Then 
we suppose that f(a) is log-normal, a specification that may be more realistic but that does not yield a 
closed-form solution of this equation. 
 
Uniform Distribution: When the utility parameter a is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 2µ ], 
the dynamic process (16) becomes:  
                                                                                                                                                             




                                     1      
(18)      St  =  S(St-1, λ ) =  ——— (µ  + 2wSt-1)                                 if  a(St-1, λ )   >  2µ  
                                2(b + w)                     
 
 
                          1 
             =  ——— {µ  + 2wSt-1 + cπ  · [2µ  - a(St-1, λ )]/2µ }      if  0  <  a(St-1, λ )  <  2µ  
                  2(b+w)                   
  
 
                                    1 
       =  ——— (µ  + 2wSt-1 + cπ )                                      if  a(St-1, λ )   <    0. 
                                2(b+w)                       
 
The function S(St-1, λ ) is continuous in St-1 and piecewise linear in its three ranges. 
We are interested particularly in the possibility of a steady-state S° in the intermediate range, 
where some women choose to have fewer children than the allowance threshold K, and some have 
more than this threshold. The intermediate-range linear equation has the unique solution 
 
                                 1                    
(19)     S°  = K + ———— [(µ  + cπ /2)(µ  + cπ /2 – 2bK)]. 
                           2bµ  - wcπ                    
  
It can be shown that this steady state is locally stable if 2bµ  > wcπ . Moreover, this intermediate 
solution satisfies the required boundary conditions 0 < a(S°, λ ) < 2µ   if  wµ  + wcπ  < b[2(b + w)K–
cπ /2] <  wµ + 2bµ .  If the boundary conditions are not satisfied or the intermediate-range steady state 
is not stable, the dynamic process converges to one of two polar steady states in which all women 
choose to have families of size less than or greater than K. Inspection of (19) shows that if the 
intermediate steady state exists and is locally stable, then S
0 > K if and only if µ  + cπ /2 > 2bK. 
Figure 6 displays how the steady state varies with the magnitude π  of the allowance.  To 
approximate the Israeli formula, we set the threshold at K = 4.  We consider two groups, both with b  
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= 0.5, c = 1, w = 0.4.  The groups differ only in the value of the parameter µ .  The first group, meant 
to represent the ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi, has µ 1= 2.5; the other group has µ 2 = 2. These figures 
were selected so that S
0
1 = 2.5, and S
0
2 = 2 in the absence of allowances; this conforms with the pre-
1955 mean fertility rates reported earlier.  It is evident that increasing the magnitude of the allowance 
π  rapidly widens the fertility gap between the two groups. With π  = 3.5, for example, the steady state 
fertility levels of the two groups become 5.6 and 3.0 respectively, increasing the fertility gap between 
the two groups from 0.5 to 2.6.  However, further increases in π  narrow the gap. 










Figure 6 : The steady-state fertility as a function of the allowance for two groups, where: 
c =1, w = 0.4, K = 4, b = 0.5, and a is distributed uniformly over [0, 4] and [0,5] 
 
The figure illustrates our assertion that a piecewise linear child allowance program combined 
with social interactions can generate fertility behavior that is qualitatively different from the linear 
case. It can be shown that when w = 0 for both groups, the fertility gap is hardly affected by the 
magnitude of the allowance. It is the force of the social interaction that initially (up to  π  = 3.2) holds 
back women of the second group from adapting to the higher allowances by increasing their number 
of children to above the threshold K = 4. And it is the same force that operates in the opposite 
direction for the first group. 
 
Log-Normal Distribution: Whereas the uniform distribution implies a unique steady state for all 
values of π  and K, a log-normal distribution may generate multiple steady states. Since we cannot  
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explicitly solve the steady-state equation (17) when f(a) is log-normal, we resort to a simple 
illustrative example. Figure 7A plots the dynamic function St = S(St-1, λ ) for particular values of  λ .  
A steady state, being a solution to the equation S
o = S(S
0, λ ), occurs when S(., λ ) crosses the 45°  line 
shown on the figure. A steady state is stable if [∂ S(., λ )/∂ St-1] < 1 when evaluated at St-1 = S
o. 
  Figure 7A plots S(St-1, λ ) for four values of λ .  In all four cases, K = 4, c = 1, w = 0.5 and f(a) 
is log-normal with mean 2.5 and standard deviation 1, for both groups. The two social groups differ 
only in the parameter b, where b1 = 0.5 and b2 = 0.625, selected so that in the absence of allowances, 
the steady-state mean number of children for the two groups are 2.5 and 2.0 respectively. The figure 
displays three plots for the first group, for three alternative allowance values π  = (3.25, 3.75, 4.25), 
and one plot  for the second group, for the middle allowance value: π  = 3.75. 
We find that when π  = 3.75, the second group has a unique steady state at S
o = 2.4 children.  
In sharp contrast, the first group has in this case three steady states, S
o = (3.69, 5.2, 6.25), of which 
only the first and third are stable.  However, when π  = 3.25 or π  = 4.25, the first group has a unique 
steady state at S
o = 3.25 and S
o = 6.7 children, respectively.  Thus, relatively small changes in 








Figure 7 Dynamic fertility behavior and steady state with a log-normal distribution  
 




















that the multiplicity of equilibria appears only when 3.59 < π   < 3.99. 
 
 
4. Attempted Structural Empirical Inference 
 
This section describes our efforts to use the fertility model developed in Section 3 to interpret 
the actual decisions made by Israeli women. Our objective was to estimate a version of the model 
that could, with some degree of credibility, be applied to examine how Israeli child allowance policy 
has affected family-size decisions.  We were unable to achieve this objective, but the attempt was 
instructive nonetheless.  We explain here. 
 
4.1. Identification in Theory and Practice 
 
Even though it is idealized in many respects, the model developed in Section 3 still has more 
than enough degrees of freedom to generate the main observed features of Israeli fertility.  The 
different rates of completed fertility observed in different ethnic-religious groups at different times 
could be produced by 
(i)  cross-sectional and time series variation in the woman-specific utility parameters 
(ii) cross-sectional and time series variation in the child allowance formula 
(iii)social interactions within and across groups. 
Indeed, the central problem that arises in empirical analysis of family-size decisions is that many 
alternative combinations of these forces could have generated the observed patterns. 
The basic identification problem is evident in equation (5), which shows that observation of a 
woman’s chosen family size only partly reveals her preferences. Observation that woman j chooses 
family size ktj implies only that the composite utility parameters (aj + 2Σ mwmjStm, bj + Σ mwmj, cj) 




(20)    (aj + 2Σ m wmjStm)(ktj – k)  -  (bj + Σ mwmj)(ktj
 2 - k
2)  + cj[Atj(ktj) - Atj(k)]   >   0,  k  ≠    ktj. 
 
The identification problem is especially stark when the child allowance formula provides benefits 
proportional to the number of children. In that case, equation (7) shows that choice of ktj children is 
consistent with any value of the parameters (aj, bj, cj; wmj, m ∈  M) such that 
 
                               aj + 2Σ m wmjStm + cjπ tj 
(21)   ktj  - ½   <        <   ktj  +  ½. 
                                      2(bj + Σ mwmj) 
 
Thus, the fertility preferences of Israeli women cannot be learned in an entirely empirical manner. 
The available data on fertility choices must be combined with a priori restrictions on the distribution 
of preferences.
24 
  In an attempt to cope with the identification problem, we refined the model in a manner that 
combined realism with tractability.  To specify the timing of fertility decisions, we supposed that 
women choose family size six-to-ten years following marriage, and base their utility calculations on 
the average annual benefits in effect during that five-year period.  This conjecture flows from the 
idea that, although women may begin to bear children soon after marriage, they need not decide so 
soon on completed family size. 
We defined reference groups by the same criteria of ethnic origin and religiosity as were used 
                                                 
24 There are further difficulties that exacerbate the identification problem inherent in revealed preference analysis. Our 
discussion has presumed that a researcher is able to observe not only the family sizes that women choose but also the 
child allowance formulas that they face and the mean family sizes of the women in their reference groups.  These are non-
trivial problems in practice. Consider the child allowance formula.  Our fertility model assumes that women choose 
family size irrevocably sometime after marriage, based on the information available at the time.  As discussed in Section 
2, Israeli child-allowance benefits have varied over time. Hence the particular timing that we assume for family-size 
decisions affects the allowance functions that we assume women use when computing the utility of alternative numbers of 
children. Moreover, throughout its existence, the Israeli child allowance program has employed a formula that predicates 
benefits on the number of children currently under age 18.  This feature of the program, as well as the variation of the 
formula over time, implies that the life-cycle magnitude of the child allowance associated with any number of children  
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in our description of fertility patterns in Israel in Section 2.3; moreover, we distinguished members 
of these groups by their year of marriage.  We focused on five ethnic-religious groups: ultra-orthodox 
Mizrahi, non-ultra-orthodox Mizrahi, ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi, non-ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi, and 
non-ultra-orthodox with Israeli-born parents. We neglected the ultra-orthodox with Israeli-born 
parents because the available sample of such persons is too small to support empirical analysis. We 
neglected the two Arab groups because their members generally did not receive child allowances 
during the period of our analysis. 
To simplify the analysis, we constrained the vector (wm, m ∈  M) of social interaction 
parameters in two important ways.  First, we assumed that women who marry in a given year are 
influenced only by women who married in the five preceding years. Second, we assumed that they 
give equal weight, say w0, to the fertility of all Jewish Israeli women married in the past five years 
and an additional weight, say w1, to members of their own ethnic-religious group. 
After considering a variety of specifications for the distribution of fertility preferences, we 
chose to work with a specification that is flexible in some respects but restrictive in others.  We 
permitted the distribution of preferences to vary freely across ethnic-religious groups and year of 
marriage.  Thus ‘ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi women married in 1955’ could have one distribution of 
fertility preferences and ‘non-ultra-orthodox Jews whose parents were born in Israel and who 
married in 1970’ could have another.  The flexibility afforded by this aspect of the model is 
appealing because there is reason to think that fertility preferences in Israel have varied both across 
groups and over time.
25 
The restrictive part of the specification is that we assumed all women who belong to the same 
ethnic-religious group and who marry in the same year to have the same values of the utility 
parameters (b, c, w0, w1).  We permitted heterogeneity only in the utility parameter a, which we 
                                                                                                                                                             
actually depends on the spacing of their births. 
25 Social scientists often hypothesize that fertility preferences vary with women’s schooling, family earnings capacity, and 
perspectives on the morality of various forms of contraception.   All of these factors, and more, have varied both across 
ethnic-religious groups and over time in Israel.  
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assumed to be distributed normal across women who belong to the same group and marry in the 
same year. This aspect of the specification was chosen for reasons of tractability; it implies that a 
simple ordered-probit model describes the probability that a woman choose any given family size. 
The above assumptions, as strong as they are, only identify the model of fertility decisions if 
the child allowance is nonlinear in the number of children.  They do not identify the model if the 
benefit is proportional to family size.  Consider women who belong to a given reference group, say g, 
who marry in a given year, say t.  For such women, let the parameter a be distributed N(µ tg, σ tg
2). Let 
Stg be the mean family size of members of group g who married in the past five years and let Sto be 
the mean family size of all other Jewish Israeli women who married in this period.  If the benefit is 
proportional to family size and is the same for all women who marry in year t, (21) implies that the 
probability of choosing k children is 
 
                                                                      a + 2w0tgSt0 + 2w1tgStg + ctgπ t  
(22)   Ptg(k; γ tg, δ tg )     =      Prob[k - ½   <       <  k + ½.] 
                                                                                 2(btg + w0tg + w1tg) 
 




(23a)   γ tg    ≡   2(btg + w0tg + w1tg)/σ tg 
(23b)   δ tg   ≡   (µ tg + 2w0tgSt0 + 2w1tgStg + ctgπ t)/σ tg. 
 
Equation (22) shows that the only identified quantities are the composite parameters γ tg and δ tg. Thus, 
a necessary condition for identification of the parameters (µ tg, σ tg, btg, ctg, w0tg, w1tg) describing the 




distribution of utility is that the benefit be nonlinear in family size.
26 
The Israeli child allowance benefit has, to varying degrees over the years, been piecewise-
linear in family size.  Nevertheless, when we attempted to estimate the model, we learned that 
piecewise-linearity of the formula provides an insubstantial foundation for empirical analysis.  In 
particular, we found that the objective functions used in either maximum likelihood or least squares 
estimation of the ordered-probit model were close to flat when evaluated at alternative parameter 
values that would formally be observationally equivalent if the allowance benefit were proportional 
to number of children.  Hence, under the maintained assumptions, we were unable to obtain reliable, 
stable estimates of the parameters describing the distribution of utility. 
  Although unpleasant, this empirical finding is instructive.  It cautions against reliance on 
nonlinearities in child allowance formulas to identify fertility preferences.  The difficulties that we 
encountered are reminiscent of those that have long afflicted attempts by empirical researchers to 
learn the effects on labor supply of benefit/tax schedules that are nonlinear in hours worked.
27 
                                                 
26  One of these parameters may be fixed in value to normalize the scale of women’s utility functions.  We do not choose 
a particular normalization here. 
 
27 See Moffitt (1992) and the articles collected in the Journal of Human Resources Special Issue on Taxation and Labor 





4.2. Structural Interpretation of “Approximate” Reduced-form Estimates 
 
  Although the assumptions imposed above did not yield usable estimates of the structural 
parameters (µ tg, σ tg, btg, ctg, w0tg, w1tg), we recognized that strengthening the assumptions could, in 
principle, make estimation possible.  A simple, flexible way to explore the implications of adding 
further assumptions is to estimate the composite parameters (γ tg, δ tg) for the various reference groups 
g and years t.  This done, we could attempt to structurally interpret the cross-sectional and time-
series variation in these estimates, via equation (23). 
For each reference group g and year of marriage t, our merged Census and Birth Registry data 
make it straightforward to estimate (γ tg, δ tg).  In years when the child allowance benefit was 
proportional to family size, equation (22) follows directly from our structural model of fertility 
decision.  Hence (22) is a reduced-form of the structural model and (γ tg, δ tg) are reduced-form 
parameters related to the structural parameters (µ tg, σ tg, btg, ctg, w0tg, w1tg) by equation (23).  When the 
benefit was piecewise-linear in family size, equation (22) does not follow directly from the fertility 
model; hence (γ tg, δ tg) are not formal reduced-form parameters. Nevertheless, it may be reasonable to 
view (γ tg, δ tg) informally as “approximate” reduced-form parameters, with π t defined to be the 
allowance per child averaged over a suitable range of family sizes. 
We used a least-squares criterion to estimate (γ tg, δ tg) for group g and year of marriage t.  
Specifically, we chose (γ , δ ) to minimize the criterion function Σ k [ftg(k) - Ptg(k; γ , δ )]
2; here ftg(k) is 
the observed frequency with which women of type (t, g) choose k children and Ptg(k; γ , δ )] is the 
choice probability given in (22).
28  We found that our estimated choice probabilities fit the observed 
                                                 
28  If equation (22) were a formal reduced-form throughout the period of analysis, conventional considerations of 
asymptotic efficiency would suggest maximum likelihood as an alternative to least-squares estimation.  However, with 
(22) sometimes being only an approximate reduced-form, least-squares estimation seemed advantageous because it does 




family-size frequencies very well. We achieved almost perfect fits for the non-orthodox groups, 
where our observed choice frequencies are based on large samples of women per year; in these cases, 
the value of the criterion function (i.e., the sum of square residuals) was generally in the range 
[0.001, 0.01].  The fits were less exact but still good for the orthodox groups, where the observed 
choice frequencies are based on samples of only ten to fifty women per year; here the sum of squared 
residuals was generally in the range [0.01, 0.05]. 
With estimates of the reduced-form parameters in hand, we used equation (23) to interpret 
their cross-sectional and time-series variation. We first explored specifications that impose no cross-
group restrictions on the distribution of utility, but do constrain the time-series variation in each 
group’s preferences. The findings were disappointing. Estimates of the structural parameters were 
statistically imprecise.  Contrary to the basic theoretical prediction that utility should rise with 
increasing child benefits, we often obtained negative estimates of the parameter ctg. 
A qualitatively more “sensible” estimate of the effect of child allowances on fertility emerged 
only when we imposed two assumptions that we find much too strong to be believable: (a) the 
parameters (σ tg, ctg, w0tg, w1tg) are constant over time and across groups and (b) the parameter µ tg, 
which describes the central tendency in private preferences for fertility, varies over time only with 
the rate of high school completion by women in group g.
29  Specifically, we set σ tg  = 1 to normalize 
the scale of utility and let equation (23a) have the form 
 
(24)   δ tg   ≡   (µ g + β H tg + 2w0St0 + 2w1Stg + cπ t), 
 
where H tg is the fraction of women of type (t, g) who complete high school and β  is a parameter. 
                                                 
29 Demographers have long viewed women’s schooling as a primary determinant of fertility preferences.  Israeli women 
experienced very substantial increases in their rates of high-school completion during the period covered by our data. 
Hence we thought it reasonable to focus on this as a source of time-series variation in fertility preferences.  There are two 
levels of high-school completion in Israel, a lower level in which a student obtains a diploma and a higher level in which 
a student also passes a national examination known as the Bagrut.  We measure high-school completion by successful 
completion of the Bagrut.  
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This done, we used our estimates of δ tg to obtain least-squares estimates of the common structural 
parameters (β δ , w0, w1, c) and the group-specific parameters µ g.  Now, finally, the estimate of c was 





To reiterate what we see as the main contributions of this research, we first called attention to 
the complex time-series and cross-sectional pattern of Israeli fertility, which is much at odds with the 
fertility transition that has occurred elsewhere in the world (Section 2). We next presented a 
theoretical analysis of the social dynamics of fertility that shows how private preferences, 
preferences for conformity, and piecewise linear child allowances could have combined to yield such 
a complex fertility pattern (Section 3). We then explained the identification problem that makes it so 
difficult to infer the actual Israeli fertility process from data on completed fertility (Section 4). 
Although much about Israeli fertility remains puzzling at the end of our investigation, we 
believe that our work casts new light on what has happened in the ultra-orthodox community. In a 
recent study of fertility and labor supply in the Israeli ultra-orthodox community, Berman (2000) has 
interpreted the trends toward increased fertility, decreased labor supply, and increased supply of time 
to religious studies in this community as the behavior of a “club” that has strengthened its norms of 
religious stringency in an attempt to maintain exclusion. Berman traces this increased stringency 
back to the 19
th century reaction of ultra-religious Jews to their exposure to modernity, and he 
implicitly views recent changes as continuation of a process that has been underway since that early 
time. Our empirical analysis cast doubt on Berman’s interpretation. We have found that in the 
marriage cohorts prior to 1955, the fertility of Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox women was almost the same 
as that of non-ultra orthodox Ashkenazi women. Hence we conclude that the current fertility  
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behavior of Israeli ultra-orthodox reflects a relatively recent phenomenon.
30  We conjecture, but 
cannot prove, that the reverse fertility transition that has occurred among the ultra-Orthodox would 
not have happened were it not for the emergence of the Israeli welfare state. 
Our work may also help to understand the conventional fertility transition. To recall, 
demographers have questioned why the fertility transition has begun in different societies under 
different economic conditions, and why it has been so rapid. It is intriguing that the reverse fertility 
transition experienced by the Israeli ultra-orthodox has similarly been rapid. We have conjectured 
that this reverse transition arose out of the combination of two key factors: non-continuity in private 
behavior, due to the piecewise linearity of child allowances, and social interactions as each women is 
influenced by the fertility decisions of other women. The same two factors are central to the recent 
analysis by Kohler (2001) of the conventional fertility transition. In his work, non-continuity in 
behavior is generated by a binary decision process, whether or not to use contraceptives, and the 
social interaction occurs when each woman is influenced by the contraception decisions of other 
women. The specifics of our research and that of Kohler differ in many respects, but each illuminates 
how non-continuity in behavior and social interactions may combine to explain the social dynamics 
of fertility. 
 
                                                 
30  The recent non-continuity in behavior is illustrated by a quote from an address by a noted Rabbi to young women in an 
ultra-orthodox seminary: “Our mothers … have absorbed too much from the odor of European culture… Our slogan must 




Table A-1. Summary of Child Allowances Criteria 
Allowance credit points  Percent of official standard adult poverty line income 
Veterans  Marginal allowance granted for k
th child, 















2000 1965 1970 1975 1992 1997 
Marginal  
cost





1  1  1 1 1 1  6.6  11.0  24.2  0
1  14.2 70 
2  1  1 1 1 1  6.6  13.2  24.2  0
1 14.2  55 
3 1.25 2 2 2 2  6.6  13.8  48.5  33.6  28.4  55 
4  1.25  2.25 3.75 4.05  4.4  11.0 20.4 54.0 96.6
1  57.4 50 
5  1.25  2.5 3.25 3.4  5  13.2  20.4  54.5  54.5 48.2  50 
6  1.25  2.5 3.5  3.75 5 14.3  21.5  60.6  58.8  53.2  45 
7+  1.25  2.5 3.5 3.5  5 16.5  21.5  60.6  58.9 49.6  40 
 
Source: NII Statistical Quarterly and Yearbooks (various years). 
1 In 1992 the allowances for the first two children were withdrawn for families with less than four children, unless 
family income was below a low threshold.
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